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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
Priority No. 2
v.

:

STEPHEN PINO,

:

Defendant/Appellant.

Qase No. 940370-CA

:

BRIEF OF APPELLEE

JURISDICTION AND NATURE PF PROCEEDINGS
This is an appeal from a conviction for automobile
homicide, a second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann.
§ 76-5-207 (1995).
This Court has jurisdiction to hear the appeal under
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(f)(Supp. 1994).
ISSUES ON APPEAL AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW

A.

Did the Trial Court Properly Conclude That the

Warrantless Blood Draw, Performed Without Defendant's Consent,
but After His Arrest, Was Justified by Exigent Circumstances?
The question of whether the warrantless blood draw was
constitutionally justified is most aptly described as one of
M

fact-to-law." Hence, though reviewed for "correctness," the

trial court's ruling is accorded a measure of deference.
v. Pena. 869 P.2d 932, 939-40 (Utah 1994).

State

In contrast, the

suppression court's findings of underlying historical facts are
subject to reversal only if clearly erroneous.
B.

Id. at 939 n.4.

Does Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-207(6) (1995), Permit

Admission of the Blood Test?
Statutory interpretation is a question of law that is
reviewed for correctness.

State v. Phathammavong. 860 P.2d 1001,

1002 (Utah App. 1993); State v. Peterson. 810 P.2d 421, 425 (Utah
1991) .
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. STATUTES. AND RULES
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-207(6) (1995):
Evidence of a defendant's blood or breath
alcohol content or drug content is admissible
except when prohibited by Rules of Evidence
or the constitution.
Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44.10(1)(a) (1995):
A person operating a motor vehicle in this
state is considered to have given his consent
to a chemical test or tests of his breath,
blood, or urine for the purpose of
determining whether he was operating or in
actual physical control of a motor vehicle
while having a blood or breath alcohol
content statutorily prohibited under Section
41-6-44 . . .

2

STATEMENT QF THE CASE
Defendant was charged with automobile homicide, a
second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5207(2) (a) (1995); kidnaping, a second degree felony, in violation
of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-3 01 (1995); and leaving the scene of an
accident, a class A misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. §
41-6-29 (1993) (R. 1-2).
Defendant filed a motion to suppress blood test results
on January 21, 1994, alleging that the blood draw had been
obtained in violation of his federal and state constitutional
rights (R. 30-31).

Following an evidentiary hearing, the trial

court denied the motion in a memorandum decision (R. 39-45) .
Thereafter, defendant entered a conditional guilty plea to
automobile homicide and the remaining counts were dismissed (R.
83-89) .
The trial court sentenced defendant to one to 15 years
in the Utah State Prison and imposed various fines and fees (R.
104-05).

The trial court stayed execution of defendant's

sentence pending the outcome of this appeal.

Id.

Defendant's bail pending appeal was revoked on June 7, 1994 and

3

his previously imposed sentenced was ordered executed (R. 24 0-42) .

STATEMENT QF THE FACTS
The trial court's memorandum decision denying
defendant's motion to suppress accurately recites the pertinent
facts (R. 39-45) (a complete copy is attached in the addendum).
The trial court's factual findings are therefore reproduced here,
adding citations to the transcript of the hearing on the motion
to suppress:
1. On Tuesday, November 30, 1993, at
approximately 2:30 P.M., a motor vehicle accident
causing serious injuries occurred on the 1-15
freeway south of Leeds, Utah, in Washington County
[Transcript of suppression hearing, March 17,
1994, ST. 298-99, 303-04, 350, 359].
2. Trooper [Dene] Kay of the Utah Highway
Patrol went to the scene of the accident and
served as the investigating officer [ST.
372] .
3. Sergeant Jim Lloyd of the Utah Highway
Patrol was called out by his dispatcher and
directed to the Dixie Regional Medical Center
in St. George, Utah, to make contact with one
of the persons involved in the accident, the
[d]efendant[,] Stephen Pino [ST. 298-301].
4. [Defendant] had been taken into custody by
Officer Tom Fjermestad of the St. George City
police department, who then placed [defendant]
under arrest for Driving Under the Influence of
Alcohol or Drugs[,] as he drove [defendant] to the

4

Dixie Regional Medical Center [ST, 352, 357-59,
361] .
5. Prior to placing [defendant] under arrest
Officer Fjermestad was presented with the
following facts and information:
a. While stopped at the stoplight
on Telegraph Street and 3050 East,
adjacent to Exit #10 of the 1-15
Freeway, [Officer] Fjermestad
observed a small, silver colored,
four door car come off the 1-15
off-ramp, drive directly to the
front of his patrol vehicle and
stop there blocking his car in the
left hand turn lane of the
intersection (T. 28)1[ST. 350].
b. After the small silver car
stopped, a man and woman, later
identified as Mr. and Mrs. Doug
Robison, exited the silver car and
approached the passenger side of
[Officer] Fjermestad's vehicle
while waving their arms
u
frantically" and appearing to be
"very upset'' (T. 29) [ST. 350] .
c. Two other gentlemen approached
the driver's side of the patrol car
from a pick-up truck that had also
traveled to the intersection with
the silver car (T. 29) [ST. 356,
359, 361-62].

1

The trial court's memorandum decision contains internal
citations to the preliminary hearing transcript (T.), held on
December 13, 1994. The preliminary hearing transcript is numbered
in the record on appeal at R. 109-194.
5

d. A "Mexican male/' later
identified as [defendant], exited
the back seat of the silver car and
ran to the back seat of the patrol
car, opened the back door and sat
down in the back seat [ST. 350].
e. The two men from the pick-up
truck told [Officer] Fjermestad
that they had witnessed an accident
on 1-15. The [sic] saw a "Mexican
male" leave the black vehicle at
the accident scene and try to get
into a "Toyota-like" pick-up truck.
That attempt was rebuffed by a man
in the "Toyota-like" truck (T. 30)
[ST. 361-63] .
f. The men from the pick-up truck
then told [Officer] Fjermestad that
they saw the "Mexican male" jump
onto the small silver car, hang
onto the windshield wipers, and
force the small silver car to stop.
The man then ran to the passenger
rear window of the small silver
car, broke open the window of the
small silver car and get inside.
The small silver car then drove off
(T. 30) [ST. 363].
g. The two men from the pick-up
truck were concerned for the safety
of the occupants of the small
silver car, so they followed it to
the encounter with Officer
Fjermestad [ST. 361].
h. Officer Fjermestad observed
some small lacerations on the inner
side of [defendant's] right
forearm.

6

i. Officer Fjermestad asked
[defendant] if the vehicle was
stolen, and [defendant] replied
that the car was his wife's and
that she was driving.
j. Officer Fjermestad noticed a
"very strong odor" of alcohol on
[defendant's] breath and noted that
[defendant's] eyes were "extremely
bloodshot" (T. 32) [ST. 354].
k. While conducting his
investigation at the intersection
of Telegraph Street and 3050 East,
Officer Fjermestad received a radio
report of a "car-jacking" and that
a "Mexican male had hijacked a car"
(T. 32) [ST. 361].
1. Thereafter Officer Fjermestad
received a request from Lieutenant
Flowers of the Utah Highway Patrol
to take [defendant] to the hospital
for a blood test.
6. On the basis of the information received
over the radio and from the conversations he
had with the occupants of the pick-up truck
that followed the small silver car, plus his
observations of [defendant's] bloodshot eyes,
the odor of alcohol on [defendant's] breath
and the lacerations observed on [defendant's]
arm, Officer Fjermestad decided to place
[defendant] under arrest for Driving Under
the influence of Alcohol or Drugs [ST. 352,
361-63] .
7. During the conversation at the
intersection between Officer Fjermestad and
[defendant], Officer Fjermestad advised
[defendant] of his right to remain silent
under the Miranda rule [ST. 351-57] .

7

8. At the Dixie Regional Medical Center [,]
Sergeant Lloyd based his arrest on the
information that he had received from Officer
Fjermestad and on the radio reports and
dispatcher calls plus his observation that
[defendant] appeared "'glassy eyed" and
smelled strongly of alcohol [ST. 305].
9. Sergeant Lloyd then read paragraph ten
from the DUI report form (Exhibit No. 1) to
[defendant]. When asked if he would consent
to the blood test [defendant] replied, U I
don't want to" [ST. 306-08].
10. Both the State and the [d]efendant have
stipulated that the blood drawing and
subsequent testing of [defendant] were done
without his consent, and the Court so finds
[ST. 326] .
11. Sergeant Lloyd then informed [defendant]
that he would insist that the blood be drawn
over [defendant's] objection [ST. 310, 334].
12. At no time did Sergeant Lloyd, Officer
Fjermestad or any other officer try to
contact a magistrate in order to procure a
search warrant to authorize the drawing of
blood from [defendant] [ST. 330] .
13. Sergeant Lloyd asked Nurse Davies of the
Dixie Regional Medical Center to draw the
blood sample [ST. 311, 340].
14. Nurse Davies used a tourniquet of latex
rubber and a 22 gauge needle (less than one
millimeter in diameter) to draw blood from
[defendant]. The blood was drawn between
3:30 and 4:00 p.m. The Court specifically
finds that this is a medically accepted and
reasonable procedure for drawing blood "from
the body [ST. 338-46].

8

(R. 39-43), see addendum.
The trial court applied Schmerker v, California/ 384
U.S. 757 (1966); In Interest Of I,,R,L,, 739 P.2d 1123 (Utah App.

1987), rev'd on other grounds; In Interest of R.L.I., 771 P.2d
1068 (Utah 1989); and State v. Hodson. 866 P.2d 556 (Utah App.
1993), cert, granted. 878 P.2d 1154 (Utah 1994), to the above
facts and concluded that:
. . . Officer Fjermestad had sufficient
probable cause to believe that [defendant]
drove the vehicle involved in the accident
while having an unlawfully excessive amount
of alcohol in his blood. The information of
the men in the pick-up truck, combined with
[defendant's] desperate flight from the scene
of the accident, combined with the bloodshot
eyes and alcohol laden breath of [defendant],
combined with the signs of injury on
[defendant's] arm all gave Officer Fjermestad
probable cause to believe that [defendant]
was driving while under the influence of
alcohol.
5. [Defendant] was lawfully arrested by
Officer Fjermestad, based upon probable
cause.
6. The observations of both Officer
Fjermestad and Sergeant Lloyd coupled with
the accident and the flight from the scene
gave a clear indication that alcohol would be
found through a blood test.
7. The exigent circumstances were present
justifying a warrantless drawing of blood
because of the dissipation of the evidence
(the alcohol) in the blood stream.
9

8. The Court has already found that the
means of drawing the blood sample were
reasonable and the appellate courts have also
sanctioned this process.
(R. 43-44), see addendum.

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The trial court properly admitted defendant's
blood/alcohol test results, obtained without his consent, but
following his arrest.

The trial court's ruling is consistent

with controlling fourth amendment law.

Indeed, Schmerber v.

Stflte Qi California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966), and In Interest of

It ,R,L,, 739 p.2d 1123 (Utah App. 1987), rev'ti on other ground,
In Interest of R.L.I.. 771 P.2d 1068 (Utah 1989), make clear that
once a defendant has been arrested, alcohol dissipation
constitutes an exigent circumstance negating the need to seek a
search warrant prior to performing a blood draw.

Moreover,

admission of the blood test is consistent with the liberalized
admissibility requirements set forth in Utah's automobile
homicide statute.
Defendant's assertions of constitutional and statutory
error are unsupported and fail to establish any flaw in the trial
court's conclusion that the instant blood draw was justified by
exigent circumstances.

Accordingly, the Court should afford the

10

trial court's correct ruling some deference and affirm the denial
of defendant's motion to suppress.
ARGUMENT
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY ADMITTED THE RESULTS
OF THE WARRANTLESS BLOOD DRAW, WHICH BLOOD
DRAW WAS PERFORMED CONSISTENT WITH
CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY STANDARDS2
Defendant challenges the trial court's determination
that the warrantless blood draw was justified by exigent
circumstances, claiming that the trial court's conclusion of
exigency is not supported by corresponding factual findings and
that any exigency was defeated by the officers' failure to first
seek a warrant.

Br. of App. at 7-8, 11-14.

Additionally, defendant narrowly claims that the trial
court erroneously admitted the blood test results under the
automobile homicide statute, Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-207 (1995), on
the ground that the 1993 amendments to the statute eliminated
u

[a]11 of the language regarding the administration of the

2

While defendant raised a nominal state constitutional
challenge to the admissibility of the blood draw evidence below
(R. 30), he has not done so on appeal. Br. of App. at 7-14.
Accordingly, the State's analysis is premised solely on fourth
amendment law. &g£ State v. Bobo. 803 P.2d 1268, 1272-73 (Utah
App. 1990) ("proper forum in which to commence thoughtful and
probing analysis of state constitutional interpretation is before
the trial court").

11

chemical test without the [defendant's consent."
10-11.
A.

Br. of App. at

Defendant's claims lack merit.
Warrantless Blood Draw Constitutionally
Justified by Exigent Circumstances
This Court has previously summarized the circumstances

under which the implied consent statute3 "justifies warrantless
searches":
(1) There is probable cause to believe the
suspect was driving or in control of a motor
vehicle while having a statutorily prohibited
blood alcohol content,
(2) The suspect was arrested, and
(3) The method of extraction of blood was
reasonable.
In Interest of I.. R.L.. 739 P.2d 1123, 1128 (Utah App. 1987),
rev'd on other grounds. In Interest of R.L.I.. 771 P.2d 1068
(Utah 1989).
757 (1966).

Accord Schmerber v. State of California. 384 U.S.
The Court further noted that the "rationale behind

£££ Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44.10(1) (a) (1995) :
A person operating a motor vehicle in this
state is considered to have given his consent
to a chemical test or tests of his breath,
blood, or urine for the purpose of
determining whether he was operating or in
actual physical control of a motor vehicle
while having a blood or breath alcohol
content statutorily prohibited under Section
41-6-44 . . .
12

permitting such a search is that the blood alcohol evidence
dissipates over time, creating an exigent circumstance which
justifies a warrantless search."

Id.4

Defendant does not dispute the trial court's findings
and conclusions that the police had probable cause to believe he
had been driving a motor vehicle while having a prohibited blood
alcohol content, that he was under arrest at the time of the
blood test, and that the blood draw method was reasonable (R. 3 943), see addendum.

Rather, defendant's sole complaint concerns

the alleged lack of exigent circumstances to justify the
officers' failure to seek a warrant prior to performing the blood
draw.

Br. of App. at 7-8, 11-14.
1. Waiver.

First, defendant complains that the trial

court's conclusion that the warrantless blood draw was justified

4

Ultimately, the Court determined that because I. R. L.
had not actually consented to the search and was also not under
arrest at the time of the blood test, the warrantless search was
not justified under either the implied consent statute (section
41-6-44.10) or the constitution. I..R.L.. 739 P.2d at 1128.
On certiorari review, the supreme court determined that
because I.R.L's blood test result was inadmissible under the
implied consent statute, the court of appeal's constitutional
analysis was unnecessary to proper resolution of the case. In
Interest of R.L.I.. 771 P.2d at 1069-70. Although the Court's
constitutional analysis was deemed superfluous, the supreme court
noted no error therein.
Id.

13

by exigent circumstances is not supported by any factual
findings.

Br. of App. at 7-8.

Specifically, defendant complains

that uthere are absolutely no findings of fact to show that there
was a need to draw the defendant's blood without a search warrant
due to the possibility of dissipation of the alcohol in [his]
bloodstream."

Br. of App. at 8.

This precise claim is waived

based on defendant's failure to assert it below.

State v.

Carter, 707 P.2d 656, 660 (Utah 1985) (MW]here a defendant fails
to assert particular ground for suppressing unlawfully obtained
evidence in the trial court, an appellate court will not consider
that ground on appeal."); State v. Webb. 790 P.2d 65, 77 (Utah
App. 1990) ("As the Utah appellate courts have reiterated many
times, we generally will not consider an issue, even a
constitutional one, which the appellant raises on appeal for the
first time."), cert, denied. 860 P.2d 943 (Utah 1993).
Although defendant challenged the existence of exigent
circumstances below, he focused solely on his claim that police
were required to first seek a search warrant (R. 384), which is
addressed in part A(2), infra.

Defendant made no argument below

that the State was required to introduce evidence as to the
precise dissipation rate of alcohol from his bloodstream or that
the trial court was required to make any specific finding in
X4

regard to his particular dissipation rate (R. 384). Because this
argument is raised for the first time on appeal and because
defendant asserts no plain error or other exceptional
circumstance excusing his failure to raise the argument below,
his claim must be rejected.

£&& State v. Archambeau, 820 P.2d

920, 922, 926 (Utah App. 1991) (declining to reach merits of
constitutional issue raised for first time on appeal where
defendant failed to demonstrate plain error or exceptional
circumstances).
Even assuming the Court were to overlook defendant's
clear waiver and reach the merits of this issue, the trial
court's reasoning in determining the existence of exigent
circumstances is patent in its findings and conclusions (R. 3 944), see addendum.

This Court must uphold the trial court, "even

if it failed to make findings on the record whenever it would be
reasonable to assume that the court actually made such findings."
State v. Ramirez. 817 P.2d 774, 786 n.5 (Utah 1991).
Indeed, although labeled as a conclusion, the trial
court expressly found that the warrantless blood draw was
justified by exigent circumstances "because of the dissipation of
the evidence (the alcohol) in the blood stream" (R. 44), see
addendum.

Cf. Ostler v. Ostler. 789 P.2d 713, 716 (Utah App.
15

1990)(appellate court will disregard label attached to ruling by
trial court and look to substance).

Moreover, the fact of

alcohol dissipation is well established in the pertinent fourth
amendment case law.

See Schmerber. 384 U.S. at 770 ("We are told

that the percentage of alcohol in the blood begins to diminish
shortly after drinking stops, as the body functions to eliminate

it from the system."); Skinner v, Railway Labor Executives'
Ass'n. 489 U.S. 602, 623 (1989) ("As the FRA recognized, alcohol
and other drugs are eliminated from the bloodstream at a constant
rate, see 49 Fed. Reg. 24291 (1984), and blood breath samples
taken to measure whether these substances were in the bloodstream
when a triggering event occurred must be obtained as soon as

possible."). £££ also City of Qrem v, Henrie, 868 p.2d 1384,
1389 (Utah App. 1994) (possible destruction of blood alcohol
evidence may constitute an exigent circumstance under certain
facts); I.,R.L.. 739 P.2d at 1128 ("rationale" behind permitting
a warrantless blood draw "is that the blood alcohol evidence
dissipates over time, creating an exigent circumstance which
justifies a warrantless search").

&Q£QX&

Tipton V, Commonwealth/

444 S.E.2d 1, 3 (Va.App. 1994) ("exigent circumstances existed
due to the dissipating nature of alcohol in blood. "[T]he delay
necessary to produce a warrant [for a blood test] may result in
16

destruction of valuable evidence.'") (citation omitted); State v.
Parker, 855 P.2d 636, 640 n.9 (Or. 1993) (State need not call an
expert on the dissipation of blood-alcohol content because the
fact that blood-alcohol dissipates over time is common
knowledge); State v. Bohlina. 494 N.W.2d 399, 402-06 (Wis.) ("a
logical analysis of the Schmerber decision indicates that the
exigency of the situation presented was caused solely by the fact
that the amount of alcohol in a person's blood stream diminishes
over time"), cert, denied,

U.S.

, 114 S.Ct. 112 (1993);

People v. Trotman. 262 Cal.Rptr. 640, 646 (Cal.App. 1989)
(finding exigent circumstances for warrantless blood draw on
ground that w[i]t is beyond question that with the passage of
time, normal physiological functions eliminate the alcohol
content of an inebriate's blood"); State v. Hollingsworth. 334
S.E.2d 463, 468 (N.C.App. 1985) ("the body's breakdown of alcohol
in the blood creates the reasonable risk that the evidence of
intoxication will quickly be destroyed"); State v. Komoto, 697
P.2d 1025, 1033 (Wash.App.) (collecting state and federal cases
for proposition that "the natural and inexorable dissipation of
blood alcohol evidence may create a

destruction of evidence'

exigency sufficient to justify a warrantless entry"), cert,
denied. 474 U.S. 1021 (1985).
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2.

No Necessity to Seek Warrant.

Second, defendant

complains that the officers' failure to seek a search warrant
negated any exigency created by the dissipation of alcohol from
his bloodstream.

Br. of App. at 11-14.

This assertion reflects

a fundamental misunderstanding of the exigent circumstances
exception to the warrant requirement.

Indeed, the whole point of

the exigent circumstances doctrine is to relieve officers of the
obligation to get a warrant when either their safety is
threatened, or the destruction of evidence is imminent.

State v.

Larocco. 794 P.2d 460, 469-70 (Utah 1990) (plurality).
Defendant's contrary assertion is wholly conclusory and overlooks
Schmerber. which is controlling on these facts.
Schmerber makes clear that in alcohol-related cases
"the delay necessary to obtain a warrant," threatens the
"destruction of evidence."

384 U.S. at 770. This is

particularly true in an automobile homicide case "where time had
to be taken to bring the accused to a hospital and investigate
the scene of the accident."

Id.

See I.,R.L.. 739 P.2d at 1128.

Under this circumstance "there [is] no time to seek out a
magistrate and secure a warrant," and the exigent circumstances
exception does not require it.

Schmerber. 384 U.S. at 770. See

alS£ State v, Morck, 821 P.2d 1190, 1194 n.l (Utah App.
18

1991)(declining to require a showing of inability to obtain a
telephonic warrant in addition to a demonstration of exigent
circumstances).

Accord United States v. Reid. 929 F.2d 990, 993-

94 (4th Cir. 1991) (rejecting claim that police should have
sought telephonic warrant prior to performing breathalyser test
on the ground that obtaining a telephonic warrant still takes
time and does not alter exigency of dissipating breath alcohol
evidence).
Based on the above, defendant fails to demonstrate that
the failure to seek a warrant in this case negated the exigency
created by the dissipating blood alcohol evidence.

The trial

court properly concluded that the warrantless blood test was
justified by exigent circumstances and this Court should so hold.
B.

Admission of Warrantless Blood Draw
Result Consistent With
Admissibility Requirements of
Automobile Homicide Statute

Admission of the blood test was also proper under the
automobile homicide statute.

Prior to its amendment in 1993,

section 76-5-207 provided for the admissibility of blood draw
evidence obtained without a warrant or consent, after the
defendant's arrest, as long as police reasonably believed that

19

the victim may die.5

The 1993 amendments broadened the

admissibility requirements under the statute by replacing the
former subsections (6)-(7) with the general clarifying statement
that

xx

[e]vidence of a defendant's blood or breath alcohol content

or drug content is admissible except when prohibited by Rules of
Evidence or the constitution."

Section 76-5-207(6).

The 1993

amendments thus added no requirements, and eliminated the earlier
requirement that police reasonably believe that the victim may
die before performing a warrantless blood draw upon an arrested
suspect.

Section 76-5-207 (1988) provided as follows:
(6) Any chemical test is admissible in
accordance with the Rules of Evidence if
administered on a defendant: (a) with his
consent; or (b) without his consent after his
arrest either under this section or under
Section 41-6-44, when the officer has reason
to believe that the victim may die.

(7)(a) After a defendant is placed under
arrest for a violation of this section, the
peace officer shall require that the
defendant submit to a chemical test of his
blood or urine. This test may be required
without the consent of the defendant, as
provided in Subsection (6)(b).

20

1.

Inadequate Legal Analysis.

Notwithstanding, in

Point 11(A) of his brief, defendant argues that the amended
version of section 76-5-207 prohibited the admission of the
warrantless blood draw in this case.
lacks meaningful legal analysis.

Defendant's suggestion

See Utah R. App. P. 24(9) ("The

argument shall contain the contentions and reasons of the
appellant with respect to he issues presented").

For example,

defendant broadly asserts that * [s]ince its amendment in 1993,
the [a]utomobile [h]omicide statute is less broad and certainly
more restrictive with respect to the suspect's right."

Br. of

App. at 10. However, defendant wholly fails to demonstrate that
the amended version sets forth any more stringent admissibility
requirement than its predecessor.

Nowhere does he articulate the

circumstances under which the amended statute operates to exclude
or restrict blood draw evidence that would have previously been
deemed admissible; nor does he demonstrate that the current
version of the statute precludes admissibility of the instant
blood test.

Indeed, defendant's conclusory assertion is

unaccompanied by any legal reasoning or case authority.
of App. at 10-11.

See Br.

As such, it is inadequate under the briefing

rule and should be rejected on that ground.
P.2d 247, 250 (Utah App. 1992).
21

State v. Price. 827

2.

Liberalized Admissibility Requirements.

In any

event, defendant's narrow assertion that the amended automobile
homicide statute somehow restricts the admissibility of blood
draw evidence is directly contrary to the broad clarifying
language of section 76-5-207(6) ("Evidence of a defendant's blood
or breath alcohol content or drug content is admissible except
when prohibited by Rules of Evidence or the constitution."), and
the pertinent case law.

As noted previously, the current version

of section 76-5-207 no longer requires that police reasonably
believe the victim may die in order to obtain a blood draw over
the refusal of an arrested suspect.

The deletion of this

requirement certainly constitutes a broadening, rather than a
tightening, of blood draw admissibility requirements for purposes
of the automobile homicide statute.
Finally, even prior to the 1993 amendments to the
automobile homicide statute, the admissibility of blood draw
evidence was subject to constitutional standards.

In State v.

Cruz, the Utah Supreme Court made clear that the implied consent
statute6 applied only upon the defendant's arrest, and that prior
to arrest actual

consent

was required.

See n.3, supra 22

446 P.2d 307, 309 (Utah

1968).

Accord State v. Steraer. 808 P.2d 122, 127 n.6 (Utah App.

1991) (implied consent statute "applicable only to persons who
have been placed under arrest"); I..R.L.. 739 P.2d at 1127
("implied consent by statute cannot supersede an otherwise
constitutionally protected right").
In sum, the 1993 amendments to section 76-5-207
impose no additional restriction on the admissibility of blood
draw evidence than was had under the former statute.

Defendant's

speculative assertion to the contrary should be rejected.
Rather, the amendments merely clarify that evidentiary and
constitutional standards apply to the admissibility of blood draw
evidence.

See section 76-5-207(6).

Because the instant blood

draw was performed incident to defendant's arrest and justified
by exigent circumstances, the Court should uphold the trial
court's determination that the admissibility requirements of 765-207(6) are met here.
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CONCLUSION
Based on the above, the Court should affirm the denial
of defendant's motion to suppress and affirm his conviction for
automobile homicide.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this ^^)

day of August, 1995.

JAN GRAHAM
Utah Attorney General

• DECKER

Assistant Attorney General
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ADDENDA

IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
WASHINGTON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

<f

STATE OF UTAH,
)
Plaintiff,

;

Defendant,

)>

MEMORANDUM DECISION

vs.
STEPHEN PINO,

Case No.931500973

The above-entitled matter came before the Court on February 15, 1994, on the
Defendant's Motion to Suppress evidence of a blood alcohol test, performed on blood taken from
the Defendant at the Dixie Regional Medical Center in St. George, Utah, on November 30,
1993. The Defendant was present at the hearing together with his counsel, Douglas D. Terry
and Phillip L. Foremaster.

The State was represented by the Washington County Attorney,

Eric A. Ludlow. Each party called witnesses and presented exhibits. The parties also referred
to the transcript of the preliminary hearing in this case, and the Court reviewed the testimony
in that transcript as well. All references to the preliminary hearing transcript will be cited as
"T.

".

From the foregoing procedure and hearing the Court makes the following:
FINDINGS OF FACT

1. On Tuesday, November 30, 1993, at approximately 2:30 P.M., a motor vehicle

accident causing serious injuries occurred on the 1-15 freeway south of Leeds, Utah, in
Washington County.
2. Trooper Dean Kay of the Utah Highway Patrol went to the scene of the accident and
served as the investigating officer.
3. Sergeant Jim Lloyd of the Utah Highway Patrol was called out by his dispatcher and
directed to the Dixie Regional Medical Center in St. George, Utah, to make contact with one
of the persons involved in the accident, the Defendant Stephen Pino.
4. Mr. Pino had been taken into custody by Officer Tom Fjermestad of the St. George
City police department, who then placed Mr. Pino under arrest for Driving Under the Influence
of Alcohol or Drugs as he drove Mr. Pino to the Dixie Regional Medical Center.
5. Prior to placing Mr. Pino under arrest Officer Fjermestad was presented with the
following facts and information:
a. While stopped at the stoplight on Telegraph Street and 3050 East, adjacent to
Exit #10 of the 1-15 Freeway, Fjermestad observed a small, silver colored, four door car come
off of the 1-15 off-ramp, drive directly to the front of his patrol vehicle and stop there blocking
his car in the left hand turn lane of the intersection.(T. 28)
b. After the small silver car stopped, a man and woman, later identified as Mr.
and Mrs. Doug Robison, exited the silver car and approached the passenger side of Fjermestad's
vehicle while waving their arms "frantically" and appearing to be "very upset".(T. 29)
c. Two other gentlemen approached the driver's side of the patrol car from a
pick-up truck that had also traveled to the intersection with the silver car. (T. 29)
d. A "Mexican male", later identified as Mr. Pino, exited the back seat of the
silver car and ran to the back seat of the patrol car, opened the back door and sat down in the

back seat.
e. The two men from the pick-up truck told Fjermestad that they had witnessed
an accident on 1-15. The saw a "Mexican male" leave the black vehicle at the accident scene
and try to get into a "Toyota-like" pick-up truck. That attempt was rebuffed by a man in the
"Toyota-like" truck. (T. 30)
f.

The men from the pick-up truck then told Fjermestad that they saw the

"Mexican male" jump onto the small silver car, hang on to the windshield wipers, and force the
small silver car to stop. The man then ran to the passenger rear window of the small silver car,
broke open the window of the small silver car and get inside. The small silver car then drove
off. (T. 30)
g. The two men from the pick-up truck were concerned for the safety of the
occupants of the small silver car, so they followed it to the encounter with Officer Fjermestad.
h. Officer Fjermestad observed some small lacerations on the inner side of Mr.
Pino's right forearm.
i. Officer Fjermestad asked Mr. Pino if the vehicle was stolen, and Mr. Pino
replied that the car was his wife's and that she was driving.
j.

Officer Fjermestad noticed a "very strong odor" of alcohol on Mr. Pino's

breath and noted that Mr. Pino's eyes were "extremely bloodshot". (T. 32)
k. While conducting his investigation at the intersection of Telegraph Street and
3050 East, Officer Fjermestad received a radio report of a "car-jacking" and that a "Mexican
male had hijacked a car". (T. 32)
1. Thereafter Officer Fjermestad received a request from Lieutenant Flowers of
the Utah Highway Patrol to take Mr. Pino to the hospital for a blood test.

6. On the basis of the information received over the radio and from the conversations
he had with the occupants of the pick-up truck that followed the small silver car, plus his
observations of Mr. Pino's bloodshot eyes, the odor of alcohol on Mr. Pino's breath and the
lacerations observed on Mr. Pino's arm, Officer Fjermestad decided to place Mr. Pino under
arrest for Driving Under the Influence of Alcohol or Drugs.
7. During the conversation at the intersection between Officer Fjermestad and Mr. Pino,
Officer Fjermestad advised Mr. Pino of his right to remain silent under the Miranda rule.
8. At the Dixie Regional Medical Center Sergeant Lloyd of the Utah Highway Patrol
also informed Mr. Pino that he was under arrest for Driving Under the Influence.

Sergeant

Lloyd based his arrest on the information that he had received from Officer Fjermestad and on
the radio reports and dispatcher calls plus his observation that Mr. Pino appeared "glassy eyed"
and smelled strongly of alcohol.
9. Sergeant Lloyd then read paragraph ten from the DUI report form (Exhibit No. 1)
to Mr. Pino. When asked if he would consent to the blood test Mr. Pino replied, "I don't want
to."
10. Both the State and the Defendant have stipulated that the blood drawing and
subsequent testing of Mr. Pino were done without his consent, and the Court so finds.
11. Sergeant Lloyd then informed Mr. Pino that he would insist that the blood be drawn
over Mr. Pino's objection.
12. At no time did Sergeant Lloyd, Officer Fjermestad or any other officer try to contact
a magistrate in order to procure a search warrant to authorize the drawing of blood from Mr.
Pino.
13. Sergeant Lloyd asked Nurse Davies of the Dixie Regional Medical Center to draw

the blood sample.
14. Nurse Da vies used a tourniquet of latex rubber and a 22 gauge needle (less than one
millimeter in diameter) to draw blood from Mr. Pino. The blood was drawn between 3:30 and
4:00 P.M. The Court specifically finds that this is a medically accepted and reasonable
procedure for drawing blood from the body.
From the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court now makes the following:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. In analyzing cases involving the warrantless taking of a blood sample from a suspect,
against his consent, the Court relies on Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966) and its
progeny.
2. Two Utah cases are reasonably on point with the issue presented to the Court in this
case. They are In the interest of I.. R. L.. 739 P.2d 1123 (Utah App., 1987) and State v.
Hodson. 227 Utah Adv. Rep 45 (Utah App., 1993).
3. In combining these authorities the Court must determine the following factors:
a. Was there probable cause to believe that this Defendant was driving a vehicle
while having a statutorily prohibited amount of alcohol in his blood?
b. Was the Defendant lawfully arrested?
c. Was there a clear indication that evidence of prohibited alcohol levels would
be found in the Defendant's blood stream?
d. Were there exigent circumstances justifying a warrantless bodily search?
e. Was the method of extracting the blood sample reasonable?
4. As to the first question, involving probable cause, Officer Fjermestad had sufficient
probable cause to believe that Mr. Pino drove the vehicle involved in the accident while having

an unlawfully excessive amount of alcohol in his blood. The information of the men in the pickup truck, combined with Mr. Pino's desperate flight from the scene of the accident, combined
with the bloodshot eyes and alcohol laden breath of Mr. Pino, combined with the signs of injury
on Mr. Pino's arm all gave Officer Fjermestad probable cause to believe that Mr. Pino was
driving while under the influence of alcohol.
5. Mr. Pino was lawfully arrested by Officer Fjermestad, based upon probable cause.
6. The observations of both Officer Fjermestad and Sergeant Lloyd coupled with the
accident and the flight from the scene gave a clear indication that alcohol would be found
through a blood test.
7. The exigent circumstances were present justifying a warrantless drawing of blood
because of the dissipation of the evidence (the alcohol) in the blood stream.
8. The Court has already found that the means of drawing the blood sample were
reasonable and the appellate courts have also sanctioned this process.
9. Based upon the foregoing Findings and Conclusions the Defendant's Motion to
Suppress is OVERRULED AND DENIED.
DATED this 17th day of February, 1994.
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